The Occupation of the Palestinian Economy: Economic relations between Israel and Palestine after the Oslo Accords and the formalization of economic dependence. by Wilmink, Charlotte L. M.
  
 
 
 
 
The Occupation of the Palestinian Economy 
Economic relations between Israel and Palestine after the Oslo 
Accords and the formalization of economic dependence. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis I will review the dynamics of economic relations between Israel and Palestine, 
in the context of its corresponding policy framework and the institutional arrangements (the 
Oslo Accords) that cover the implementation and management of those relations. I focus on 
the effect of the agreements on Palestine’s capacity to generate revenue, and will analyse 
this from three economic domains in which revenue can be generated: trade, taxation and 
labour. I will argue that the Oslo peace process has formalized and institutionalized 
economic relations that foster serious economic dependency, and that the agreements have 
failed to address the core economic weaknesses the Palestinian economy has had to deal 
with as a consequence of prolonged occupation and colonial structures. 
 
 
 
C.L.M. Wilmink 
S2233169 
 
 
MA Middle Eastern Studies, Faculty of Humanities 
Dr. C.A. Ennis 
Second reader: Dr. S.P. Englert 
August 31, 2020 
Wordcount: 19476 
Keywords: Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Oslo Accords, economic dependence, revenue generation 
 2 
Foreword 
 
It was in the last couple of weeks before finishing this thesis that I sat down with a friend of a friend who was 
travelling through the Netherlands and needed some guidance and tips. He was from Israel and was making a trip 
through Europe. In conversation he told me that he lived in a kibbutz roughly ten kilometres away from Jerusalem. 
Upon realisation that I knew more about the Middle East than he had expected, we started discussing the region. 
Soon enough, Palestine and their relationship vis-à-vis Israel became the topic of conversation. When we spoke 
about where he stood on peace with the Palestinians, he answered: “We cannot negotiate with a non-existing state. 
They don’t have a government, they don’t have a functional justice system or police force, they don’t have a 
functioning economy.” There might be some truth in the statement he made, in the sense that these institutional 
issues are problematic for the development of Palestine. It also made me think of my own thesis. His statement is 
a summary of the vicious circle that Palestine finds itself in. They are denied peace because they are not developed 
enough, and they are denied genuine development because they are not peaceful enough. With the agency in the 
hands of Israel, the Palestinians (and their justice system, police force and more importantly their economy) are 
held captive in this circle. It is often only the violence that reaches the news, emphasizing the fact that Palestine 
does not comply with Israel’s security standards. It is however the other side of the coin that I wish to shine light 
upon. If there ever will be peace, it needs to incorporate genuine restructuring of the economic relations between 
Israel and Palestine that can foster a relationship based on equal opportunity, equal dependence and a more equal 
power-balance. 
 
Upon that note, some words of gratitude are in place. First and foremost, I would like to express my deep gratitude 
to Dr. Crystal Ennis. She has been the kind of supervisor everyone wishes for and has offered me outstanding 
support when things did not turn out as planned. Secondly, I would like to thank Dr. Sai Englert for inspiring me 
and teaching me so much more than I could have hoped for; it was for his courses that I realised I was in the right 
spot and chose the right programme. In a similar vein, I would like to thank the department of Middle Eastern 
Studies at Leiden University for having created such as wonderful and diverse programme, for it has been proven 
that doing a second master’s degree was worth every second (including writing a second thesis).  
In these strange times some words of thanks to my immediate surroundings are also in place, as ‘immediate’ 
became more literal than anyone could have foreseen. I would like to thank Elske Verwiel for being the most 
patient and understanding boss, but most of all for letting me use her house as a private library during the last leg 
of this thesis-journey. A massive thank you to my friends, especially those who were with me studying the entire 
summer – a special shout out to Kisha Wooding, Esin Erdogan and Esmée van Weenen. Lastly, I want to thank 
my parents for always trusting me and having supported every (academic) decision I have made so far. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When the Palestine Liberation Organization and the government of Israel in 1993 entered into 
a series of negotiations that would finally lead to the Oslo Accords, a new era for the peace 
process started. The ‘Oslo process’ was thought to be able to bring about peace, partially 
through fulfilling the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Oslo Accords 
conceived the idea that the solution to the Palestinian question was going to be a ‘two-state’ 
solution. Explaining what the aim of the negotiations would be, Article I of the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) states that a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority” was to be 
established, “leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1973). Article V (DoP) again confirms this aim, stating that “Permanent status 
negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third 
year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people’s 
representatives.” 
The new narrative of a future independent Palestinian state next to the independent state of 
Israel was widely accepted as the new road to peace in the region. However, this focus on two 
separate states obscured a very important aspect of the ability of the peace process to succeed. 
The envisioned two-state narrative failed to adequately address the problem that for Palestine 
to attain statehood and be one of the states of the two-state solution, they required sovereignty 
and control over their economy.1  
 
Economic policy did play a role in the peace negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords. 
Besides the fact that the need to induce economic development for the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank was recognized in the DoP (see Article XI, Annex III and Annex IV), a separate protocol 
was designed to govern economic relations and their implementation: the Protocol on 
Economic Relations, better known as the Paris Protocol (signed April 29th, 1994). Despite the 
fact that the two-state solution was one of the envisioned end-goals of the Oslo peace process, 
the protocol failed to account for the fact that at the point of entry, the two parties were not 
equal; one was a sovereign state, the other was not. Since the protocol was drafted without 
taking asymmetrical power relations between Israel and Palestine into account, Israel was able 
 
1 ‘The Palestinian economy’ (or in any other phrasing) throughout this document refers to both the economy of 
the West Bank as well as the economy of the Gaza Strip. This does not however include those areas where 
settlements were built, or Palestinian villages within Israel. Whenever relevant, differences between the Gaza 
Strip economy and the West Bank economy will be discussed.  
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to exert significant influence on the provisions and regulations in the protocol (Haddad, 2016). 
It affected Palestine’s ability to protect their economic interests and has consequently provided 
Israeli economic policymakers with free reign to protect their own economy and at the same 
time, expand their control over the economy of the Occupied Territories (Arnon & Weinblatt, 
2001). Despite the fact that Israel has signed the Oslo Accords, knowing its supposed aim was 
an independent, sovereign Palestinian state, they have implemented policies that limit and even 
in some areas erode Palestine’s government’s ability to achieve any form of economic 
independence, essential to the process of state formation. It deprived Palestine from the 
opportunity to free itself from the occupational and colonial economic dependence on Israel, 
that resulted from the decades of direct occupation. This has brought about severe 
consequences for the Palestinian economy, that has not been able to develop into a well-
functioning economy with its own trade relations, control over its revenue, and a sustainable 
growth rate (UNCTAD, 2011; Roy, 2001). Oslo’s supposed aim to bring prosperity to the 
Palestinian economy with its regulations has thus in fact worked out quite differently and 
ironically enough caused a severe economic crisis in the years after its implementation (Arnon 
& Weinblatt, 2001). 
 
1.1.  Structure and argument 
 
The decades prior to the Oslo peace process fostered a relationship of heavy dependence on 
the Israeli economy, and the Palestinian economy does not seem to have been able to undo 
itself from that reliance successfully. Nothing meaningful has changed in the economic 
relations with Israel after the Oslo peace process, other than a re-articulation of those relations. 
As such the path to economic sovereignty and statehood still seems long. This warrants the 
question in what way the Oslo Accords could have contributed to Palestine’s economic 
dependence on Israel. The question that I attempt to answer in this thesis is thus as follows: 
 
How did the Oslo Accords affect economic relations between Palestine and Israel and to what 
extent have they contributed to the continuation of Palestinian economic dependency on Israel? 
 
The central argument in this thesis is that the Oslo process, and with it the Paris Protocol, have 
ultimately led to the formalization and continuation of one-sided economic dependence. I 
intend to show this by looking at how economic dependence was formalized through economic 
regulations and arrangements that were part of the Oslo Accords. In order to do so, I focus on 
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the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to generate revenue. Efficient revenue mobilization is 
a vital feature of (economic) sovereignty (Tilly, 1992). To narrow down the scope of this thesis, 
I will solely focus on three major economic domains in which revenue can be generated, that 
at the same time are covered in the Oslo Accords: trade, taxation and labour.2 In making this 
distinction, I roughly follow the framework used in Zagha & Zomlot (2004). I will argue that 
the imposed economic dependence is ultimately rooted in the economic and fiscal control that 
Israel has had over Palestine’s means to generate revenue. The argument is however not 
complete without an analysis of the economic relations prior to the Oslo process, as I argue 
that the evolution of economic relations between Israel and Palestine between 1967 and 1993 
played a pivotal role in setting up the mechanisms of dependence. The resulting power-
imbalance consequently affected the way the Oslo agreements were shaped during the 
negotiations. The normative side of this power-dynamic influenced every dimension of the 
Oslo Accords, including the economic dimension, and will thus also be discussed.   
 
1.2.  Relevance of the study 
 
Thinking about and researching the possible solutions to the ongoing conflict in the area where 
Israel and Palestine both seek (full) sovereignty, remains important and relevant as long as the 
conflict has not been resolved. Assessing the degree to which there is tension between on the 
one hand the Oslo-envisioned Palestinian state, and on the other hand the economic 
dependency that it possibly formalized is important, for it questions the relevance and viability 
of the two-state solution. It could prevent the two-state solution from being presented in the 
media, academic literature and by government officials as the preferred outcome, when that 
outcome might not be viable at all. The perpetual discourse on the two-state solution by many 
Western states and the United States might become less of a priority if it is indeed not viable 
and could make way for a new discourse on solutions that recognize the economic dimension 
of the occupation and the power-inequality between the two adversaries. 
It is thus important to shine light on the economic dimensions of the two-state solution and 
how the occupation has, in the past and in the present, influenced Palestinian economic agency. 
Not many scholars have focussed specifically on revenue generation, but those who have (see 
for example Zagha & Zomlot, 2004; Hamed & Shaban, 1993), have not (thoroughly) linked it 
 
2 I thus leave out other economic domains from which revenue flows in to the Palestinian economy (such as 
foreign aid). 
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to the viability of an economically sovereign Palestinian state and the two-state solution as 
purported in the Oslo Accords. Other scholars (e.g. Halevi, 1998; Hilal & Khan, 2004; Dumas, 
1999; Samara, 2000; Cheong, 2009) have focussed on both the external and the internal 
constraints to Palestinian economic sovereignty or independence. I do acknowledge that 
internal circumstances such as fiscal leakage and revenue mismanagement on the side of the 
Palestinian National Authority are important and have a significance influence on Palestine’s 
economy. Yet, that would require an analysis at a different level. As Zagha and Zomlot (2004, 
p. 121) held: “An evaluation of the economic viability of the PNA’s route to state formation 
has to distinguish between problems due to its own internal governance institutions and those 
due to external constraints.” Furthermore, the internal mismanagement is often an indirect 
result of restrictive or predatory economic policies, or otherwise a way to divert those. In my 
thesis, I will thus solely focus on the external constraints presented by Israel’s economic 
policies, the Paris Protocol and the Oslo Accords in general. 
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2. Conceptualizing revenue generation in an occupied economy 
 
In the following chapter I elaborate on the argument I make in this thesis, by first explaining 
how I conceptualize the link between economic dependence, economic sovereignty and 
revenue generation. Following that, I will explain how I approach my analysis and how it will 
be structured. 
 
2.1. From economic dependence to economic sovereignty 
 
Due to poor economic results in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israeli policy makers 
already realised the need for economic restructuring prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords 
(Arnon, 2007). The Palestinian economy had been subordinated to the Israeli economy for 
decades and lacked control or sovereignty over it, due to the military and institutional hold 
Israel had over Palestine during the direct occupation (El-Musa & El-Jafaari, 1995; Arnon & 
Weinblatt, 2001; Roy, 1999, 2001). Through colonial economic structures and policies, Israel 
had controlled Palestinian resources (largely territorial), its labour power and thus also their 
means to generate revenue. As a consequence, the Palestinian economy saw little to no 
development, or any improvement in the standard of living. The Oslo Accords even recognized 
the need for economic growth in the territories in the DoP, Article XI (see also Annex III and 
Annex IV of the DoP). According to Molkner (1996, p. 1420), the successful implementation 
of Palestinian self-determination and the development of viable statehood relied on i.a. 
substantial economic growth “that is rapid, profound, and sustained.” Economic growth was 
not only needed to alleviate the Palestinian people out of poverty, it would also stimulate their 
economy to become less dependent on that of Israel. Economies that are geographically this 
close to each other are inevitably linked to each other. However, for both economies to function 
on a sovereign basis, the one-sided dependence of Palestine on the Israeli economy was 
problematic.  
The ability to undo itself from the structures of dependency, and to regain control over their 
economy lies, for a large part, in their capacity to generate revenue. As mentioned in the 
introduction, efficient revenue mobilization can induce economic growth, and increases control 
over one’s economy (Tilly, 1992). Revenue generation thus played (and still does) a central 
role in any attempt to decrease or undo Palestinian economic dependence on Israel. In the 
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following section I will elaborate more on the link between revenue generation and economic 
sovereignty. 
 
2.2. Revenue generation and economic sovereignty 
 
For any state to be able to cover its expenditures, state income is necessary. Revenue generation 
is an important policy concern for any state, but especially for a state that is in the process of 
formation (Fjeldstad & al-Zagha, 2004). It links (state) capital to the ruler of that state, and 
therefore both informs a polity of who is in control, but also proves the existence of that polity 
(see for example Kaufman, 2002). Several authors have held that the efficient collection of 
revenue is central to the building of state capacity, the ability of the state to deliver services 
and goods to its people. With that, it plays a crucial role in shaping the relations between the 
state and society (Levi, 1988; Moore, 1998; Steinmo, 1993). Effective revenue generation is 
thus inextricably linked to a degree of economic control. It creates a contract between the 
government and the governed within an area delineated by borders, or in other words: it creates 
fiscal and economic control over a polity. If the government possesses that control over the 
polity, it is in the position to create economic policies and regulations, and raise revenue 
without the interference of other actors (Christians, 2009). Assuming that a state that enjoys 
that level of control acts rationally in the pursuit of revenue, it can design those policies to 
maximize economic growth (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 1998). Roughly following the Westphalian 
notion of domestic sovereignty (as opposed to interdependence sovereignty), the ability to raise 
revenue facilitated by fiscal control over the polity thus amounts to the concept of economic 
sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). 
Of course, in reality, economic sovereignty is a relative concept. It is restricted by a multitude 
of factors such as the trade-off between autonomy and cooperation (think for example the 
European Union), or the behaviour of other sovereigns concerning trade (Arnon & Weinblatt, 
2001; Christians, 2009). But chiefly, economic sovereignty can be understood as the (relative) 
freedom of a state to choose their own economic, fiscal and monetary policies, without the 
interference of other actors. For a state in the process of formation this is thus paramount. 
Regardless of the type of strategies and policies a state implements to generate economic 
growth, the freedom and independence of that choice is what makes a state sovereign from an 
economic perspective. 
There has been little to no improvement in Palestine’s freedom to choose and implement 
policies with the aim of inducing economic growth, nor has there been any significant 
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economic development. This seems to indicate that there is a discrepancy between the stated 
goals of the Oslo Accords to establish a future Palestinian state, with complementary economic 
growth and development and the actual outcome of the relations between Israel and Palestine 
(at least the economic dimension). Following the link between revenue generation and 
economic dependence as described in the previous sections, the question how the Oslo Accords 
could have contributed to the continuation of economic dependence, and the lack of economic 
growth and development requires an analysis of the way revenue generation is incorporated in 
the Accords. In the following section I will elaborate how I will approach aforementioned 
analysis. 
 
2.3. Parameters of revenue generation 
 
Loosely based on the division used by Zagha & Zomlot (2004), my analysis of the relevant 
regulations that cover revenue generation directly or indirectly, is divided into three categories: 
trade, taxation, and labour and employment. All three categories constitute major economic 
bases in which revenue can be generated: 
i. Trade can induce economic growth and generate in several ways. I will focus mostly 
on how the Oslo Accords regulate import and export policy. Not only is the import 
of certain goods (think for example computers) of vital importance for (economic) 
development, the import and export of goods can substantially contribute to state 
revenue. 
ii. Taxation is a straight-forward category to include, as it directly generates revenue 
from the tax base. It must be noted, however, that I will not incorporate any 
regulations or articles concerning domestic taxation. The focus of this category 
largely lies on tax collection, which is done through the revenue clearance system 
with Israel. It thus covers areas of taxation in which the relationship between 
Palestine and Israel is of importance. 
iii. Labour is one of the main pillars of the economic relationship between Palestine 
and Israel. In my analysis, I mostly focus on the labour flows between the two 
economies, and to a lesser extent the effect of relevant regulations on domestic 
employment generation (which in itself induces domestic revenue accumulation). I 
will also include structures of demand and supply. The integration of the two labour 
economies, if in a fair and efficient way, can also be a way to integrate capital. It 
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furthermore simply brings in revenue through both remittances and deductions on 
income.  
 
2.4. The Oslo Accords – ‘the interim agreements’ 
 
For the purpose of defining the scope of my thesis and general clarification, the following 
section describes which agreements I consider belonging to the “Oslo Accords”. Following 
Hassan (2011), the following nine agreements are those that generally speaking came to be 
known as the Oslo Accords:  
 
1. Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO, signed 9 and 10 September 
1993. 
2. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (more commonly 
known as “DoP” or “Oslo-I”), signed 13 September 1993. 
3. Protocol on Economic Relations (more commonly known as “the Paris Protocol”), 
signed 29 April 1994. 
4. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (more commonly known as the 
“Cairo Agreement”), signed 4 May 1994. 
5. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, signed 29 August 
1994. 
6. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (more 
commonly known as “Oslo-II”), signed 28 September 1995. 
7. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed 15 January 1996. 
8. Wye River Memorandum, signed 23 October 1998. 
9. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, signed 4 September 1999. 
 
These nine agreements together fall under the category of “Interim Agreements” that were to 
deal with the status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Paris Protocol is the chief 
document covering economic relations (specifically trade, taxation and labour relations), and 
will thus have a central role in the analysis.3 Some of the agreements do not cover economic 
relations and will therefore not directly be referred to. 
 
3 The Protocol on Economic Relations was later annexed to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or Oslo II, and can thus also be found there. 
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A note must be made on the interim nature of the agreements, as it has a bearing on how the 
regulations purported in them can be interpreted and should be analysed. They are considered 
interim, as continued negotiations were to take place to eventually reach a decision on the 
permanent status of these territories. During the first stages of negotiating, it was decided that 
the two parties were not ready to settle a permanent deal about the large amount of contentious 
issues. Consequently, an interim period of five years was installed, in which both parties had 
to continue negotiating and show their good faith during the process (Lieberfeld, 2008). Issues 
that were postponed included the status of Jerusalem, the issue of Palestinian refugees outside 
of the Occupied Territories and the Israeli settlements. Despite the clear time-mark of five 
years, the end goal (or rather: a settlement on those issues) of this interim period was left 
undefined (Hassan, 2011). As it was never made clear what a settlement of those issues would 
have to include or what they would entail, any ambiguity in those agreements, that was meant 
to serve the transition into a permanent agreement on the status of the territories, could be used 
to serve a party’s own interests as this would not directly counter the purpose of the agreements. 
In this case, Israel, which enjoyed military and political dominance, was able to impose its 
interpretation of those ambiguous clauses. According to Zagha and Zomlot (2004),  
given the balance of power between Israel and the PNA, the incompleteness in the 
arrangements was advantageous for Israel as the meaning of particular clauses or the 
response to changed circumstances could be interpreted by Israel in line with its strategies 
at that time (p. 123). 
Shlaim (1994) even held that “the Oslo Accords are guilty of ‘creative recalcitrance’, of 
formulations that intended to be vague and subject to various interpretations that would give 
Israel free hand in doing what it wants” (p. 32). In sum, the interim nature of the agreements 
and the lack of a concrete final status for the Palestinian state served the interests of Israel.  
 
2.5. A note on methodology 
 
As the purpose of this thesis is concerned with the economic relations between Israel and 
Palestine and the economic dependence of the latter, this research will inevitably take the form 
of a single-case study. The history, the present and the future of the conflict between Israel and 
Palestine are unique and beg research that focuses on the particular features of the conflict. 
Though the theoretical link between revenue generation and economic dependence concerns 
virtually every state, its application to the case of Israel and Palestine makes the case study a 
unique one (Bryman, 2012). The idiographic approach that taken in this case study research 
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will allow me to build on and contribute to knowledge on the complex and particular nature of 
the occupation (Bryman, 2012). 
It could be argued that a similar research question could be asked, where the two concepts of 
(one-sided) economic dependence and state formation are linked that could incorporate a larger 
group of case studies, of which Palestine could be part. However, to satisfyingly answer my 
research question, the element of the (military) occupation is vital to my analysis. To my 
knowledge, there has not been a similar situation in history where an occupation has taken the 
duration nor such a complex form to the extent that it could be compared with the chosen case 
study. It is therefore, that I chose to treat this as a unique, single, case. 
 
2.6. Structure of the analysis 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the freedom to create economic policies and the possibility to achieve 
economic sovereignty by decreasing economic dependence on Israel are undermined. Firstly, 
the years of occupation created a highly confined policy space for the Palestinian leadership 
and subjugated Palestinian economic policy to that of Israel. I provide a contextualisation of 
that dependence, and how it was structured prior to 1993, in Chapter 3. Secondly, their 
economic relations are now governed by the Oslo Accords, which did not take into account the 
unequal power-balance (normative as well as economic) at the time of negotiating the 
agreements. This took away their agency and autonomy in creating economic, fiscal and 
monetary policy – a necessary feature of economic sovereignty. The intricacies of the 
negotiation phase are covered in Chapter 4. Despite the fact that the Oslo process introduced 
the idea of a future statehood for Palestine, I hold that its agreements have not contributed to 
any more economic autonomy or independence, which I show in Chapter 5.  
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3. Economic relations prior to the Oslo peace process 
The economic relations between Israel and Palestine, as they were shaped post-1967, were the 
most important factor in laying the groundwork for the course of Palestinian economic 
development and structure up to the Oslo period. Economic policies dictating the relationship 
between the two were unilaterally imposed by Israeli governments and were overseen and 
managed by the Civil Administration of the Israeli army (Israel Defense Forces) (Arnon & 
Weinblatt, 2001; Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). A multitude of military orders were issued 
from the beginning of the occupation, of which roughly half pertained to economic matters 
(Samara, 1988). They concerned matters such as taxations, trade, banking, insurance, 
industries, water and land, labour – areas which were to be slowly integrated into the Israeli 
economy, and thus needed to be harmonized with Israel’s national and regional policies and 
interests. Samara (2000) similarly argued that these policies were reflective of the ‘principle 
aim’ of the post-67 Israeli occupation to submerge the Palestinian economy into the Israeli 
economy and to ‘adjust’ it to the interests of the latter. The military orders pertaining to 
economic relations effectively isolated the Occupied Territories from the rest of the region and 
the world, making Israel its only possible market for the import and export of goods and labour 
(Samara, 1988). This also meant that Israel took on the role of the main (almost sole) supplier 
of goods into the Occupied Territories. The integration of the Palestinian economy was further 
facilitated by policies that slowed down local development and weakened economic 
infrastructure. In 1985, the position of Israel on the development of Palestine was clarified in 
the official stance on the territories by then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, stating that “there 
will be no development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for 
expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel” (UNCTAD, 
1986, p. 3). Arnon et al. (1996) argued that the implementation of such policies “transformed 
important parts of the Palestinian economy into a captive market for Israeli producers.” Whilst 
depriving the Palestinian economy from the means to develop, the policies were at the same 
time aimed at carefully absorbing its labour force and productive resources. 
3.1. Selective integration and a quasi-customs union: 1967 – 1980s 
 
In the period following the 1967 war, economic policies were shaped with the aforementioned 
aim of the (selective) integration of the Palestinian economy. A committee referred to as ‘the 
Bruno Committee’ was assigned with the task to examine possible economic policies for the 
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newly ‘gained’ territories under Israeli control. Amongst other policy recommendations, they 
proposed that “Palestinian labour not be permitted into the Israeli economy while allowing free 
passage for goods and services between the Territories and Israel” (Arnon, 2007). Contrary to 
the recommendations of the Bruno Committee, the Israeli government decided to allow free 
movement of labour and restricted trade. There was still relative free movement of goods 
between the Occupied Territories and Israel, yet with regulations and structures in place to 
protect the productive sectors of Israel. The agricultural sector serves as an illustration of how 
such protectionist policies affected the productive capacity of the Palestinian economy. 
Palestinian farmers had been substantially disadvantaged as around 60 per cent of the cultivable 
land had been confiscated in the years after 1967. They faced water access restrictions4, were 
forced to adhere to crop patterns (those in demand on the Israeli market), and their agricultural 
exports were heavily restrained. Their products were crowded out by highly subsidized 
agricultural imports from Israel (Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). Small, local farmers could 
not compete with the high production volume and were slowly forced into unemployment. 
Consequently, the surplus rural labour force (as well as the unemployed in other sectors) had 
to look outside of the domestic economy for employment.  
As wages lay higher in Israel and the employment generation potential was low in the 
Palestinian economy, a large share of the Palestinian labour force looked for employment 
outside the domestic economy. Though the ratio between the wage in the Palestinian labour 
market and the wage in the Israeli labour market did not remain as favourable as it was in 1968 
(a ratio of about 2:1), approximately 30% of labourers from the Gaza Strip and 40 % of 
labourers from the West Bank had entered the Israeli labour market by 1972 (Arnon & 
Weinblatt, 2001). For the Palestinian working class, Israel thus increasingly became the main 
outlet for employment.  
In a similar vein, the business or capitalist class also integrated into the Israeli labour market. 
As Israeli businessmen started to invest in certain sectors of the Occupied Territories (though 
not necessarily the productive ones), they integrated the Palestinian capitalist class in such a 
way that they functioned as subcontractors for the commercial goals of the Israeli investors. 
According to Samara (2000) this distorted the “natural equation of labor to capital found in 
most societies,” as “both the working class and the capitalist sectors became integrated, 
 
4 The total annual water supply of the Palestinian territories at the time lied at around 800 million cubic metres, 
of which the Palestinians were only allowed to use 110 million. The scarcity of fresh and clean water forced 
many farmers to resort to water with a much higher salinity degree (brackish water), thereby reducing the 
quality of their products and reducing their competitiveness (Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009, p. 6). 
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separately, in the Israeli center” (p. 22). The duality of a protected Israeli economy and an 
underdeveloped Palestinian economy set in motion the absorption of the Palestinian labour 
force for the coming decades as it forced virtually all Palestinian social classes to interact with 
the Palestinian economy (Samara, 1988). 
Meanwhile, the higher wages in the Israeli economy drove up those in the Palestinian territories 
without inducing an increase in productivity. Subsequently, production costs increased, 
causing a lower profitability of local production and the contraction of the industrial and 
agricultural sector in Palestine. The migration of the labour force to Israel thus also resulted in 
the ‘de-industrialization’ and ‘de-agriculturalization’ of the Palestinian economy. Over time, 
this meant that the Palestinian economy became increasingly oriented towards the export of 
low-skilled, non-tradeable goods and services (construction and services), while becoming 
more dependent on the import of high-skilled, tradable goods from Israel (UNCTAD, 2016). 
The trade imbalance was further worsened by the restrictions on the export of certain products 
into Israel. The trade regime between Israel and the Occupied Territories was thus fully dictated 
by Israeli policy. Conceptually, the trade framework corresponded to one of a quasi-customs 
union. It was different from a normal customs union, as the implementation of the protectionist 
policies for only one side of the union was (and remains) unusual. It furthermore did not have 
any policy in place arranging the division of import tax revenues (which would be normal in 
the case of a single external border). Most of these revenues directly accrued to Israel (Arnon, 
2007).  
Lastly, as the customs union framework was unilaterally implemented by Israel and the terms 
were not consulted with both parties to the union, and Arnon (2007, p. 585) refers to it as an 
“imposed customs union.”  
 
3.2. The logic of security and imposed separation: 1990s 
 
As a consequence of the first Intifada in 1987 and the start of the Gulf War, the relations 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis changed significantly. The structures of the 
occupation became much more informed by Israel’s “security first” logic (Taghdisi-Rad, 
2014). It was in the few years prior to the Oslo peace process that Israeli strategy seemed to 
turn more towards imposed separation from the Palestinians. The overriding logic of security 
influenced many of the pre-existing economic policies towards the Occupied Territories. Both 
a permit system and the closure policy were introduced. The permit system regulated the 
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movement of people between Israel and the Occupied Territories, and based permission to 
access on security considerations. The closure policy refers to the system that was imposed 
after the Gulf War in order to exert even tighter control over the movement of Palestinians 
(mostly workers) and commodities. These closures can be external, restricting the movement 
from the Occupied Territories into Israel, Jordan and Egypt, or internal, restricting the 
movement of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank or within those 
regions, or (Roy, 1999; Taghdisi-Rad, 2014).5 A direct effect of the ‘closure regime’ was the 
rising poverty rate. Roy (1999, p. 69) found that periods of closure in 1996 resulted in fiscal 
losses that amounted to 18.2 per cent of the West Bank’s GNP and up to 39.6 per cent of the 
Gaza Strip’s GNP. The closures furthermore disrupted the (already fragile) contiguity of 
Palestine, as internal closures almost entirely quashed movement of labourers and goods 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Roy, 2001). Closures specifically often restricted 
access to Jerusalem, which subsequently caused for the division of the West Bank into a 
northern region and a southern region (Roy, 2001). The internal separation of Palestinian areas 
is often referred to as the ‘bantustanisation’ or ‘enclavization’ (see for example Farsakh, 2002a, 
2005a; Roy, 2001) and played a central role in the segregationist policies of the period leading 
up to Oslo. This had severe consequences for the labour force (unreliable access to work), but 
also reduced potential foreign investment, for the risk of such ventures was considered too high 
(El-Musa & El-Jafaari, 1995). It was a move away from the integrationist policies that had 
defined the decades prior to the Gulf War. The “separation strategy” altered the nature of 
control and facilitated continued domination over land, resources and labourers while at the 
same time enabling increasingly minimal interaction with and between the Palestinian 
population. As the Israeli Prime Minister held at the time: “the less of [Palestinians] that will 
work in Israel, the better … now is the time to bring about substantial change through 
separation … we must see to it that Palestinians do not swarm us” (UNCTAD, 1993, p. 7). This 
set in motion a process of ‘liberalizing’ the economic policy towards the Occupied Territories. 
To undo itself from any potential reliance on Palestinian labour, the Israeli authorities 
governing the territories started to encourage industrial investment (by giving tax exemptions) 
and eased restrictions on capital inflows. They encouraged subcontracting Palestinian labour 
inside the territories, as opposed to their employment inside Israel. This part of the separation 
strategy however did not meaningfully change anything for the Palestinian economy as it was 
 
5 As these measures significantly affected the Palestinian labour force, they are discussed in more detail in the 
section on labour and employment.  
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not accompanied by the necessary complementary (financial) infrastructure. It furthermore 
created a complex dichotomy between domestic Palestinian economic development and the ad 
hoc nature of the closure regime (sealing off the territories by definition stood in the way of 
any economic development) (Taghdisi-Rad, 2014; Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). 
 
In sum, the period between 1967 and the Oslo peace process can be characterized as, on the 
one hand, the decade-long structural integration of the Palestinian economy into the Israeli 
economy, through the establishment of the quasi-customs union and the restricted investment 
and capital flows into Palestine. It furthermore facilitated the maximization of territorial 
integration through the military control of the land. On the other hand, while the Palestinians 
were left with the legacy of years of direct occupation, the separation strategy, dictated by 
Israeli security concerns, came to shape the last few years and continued into the years of the 
Oslo peace process. The tension between strategies of integration and strategies of separation 
are an integral part of the economic contextual backdrop against which the Oslo peace process 
must be analysed and understood. 
 
3.3.  Towards Oslo 
 
The aforementioned economic structures and strategies ultimately set the stage for the start of 
the negotiations over economic policy in the Oslo process. It gave rise to a set of regulations 
and agreements that would come to govern the economic relations between Israel and Palestine. 
Amongst them was the Paris Protocol that was signed in 1994, with the declared objective of 
encouraging Palestinian economic development, within the larger framework of the Oslo 
Accords which proposed the objective of Palestinian (future) statehood. The Oslo process was 
seen as a turning point in the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians, not solely 
because it dealt with mutual recognition for the first time (Jamal, 2000). The envisioned 
outcome of a peace between the two parties also changed direction with a new focus on the 
two-state solution. This outcome, however, was contingent upon the bargaining positions with 
which Israel and Palestine entered the negotiations. As the preceding decades had created an 
uneven power balance (see the previous section), they could not be considered partners of 
‘equal worth’ during the negotiations (Jamal, 2000). In the following section, I will further 
clarify why the Palestinian delegation and the Israeli delegation to the peace process were 
unequal partners, and how this manifested during the bargaining process and in the structural 
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design of the final agreement. It is important to consider this, as the economic policies that 
followed from the Oslo period are a reflection of the inequality between the two parties. 
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4. The Oslo peace process – partners of ‘unequal worth’ 
 
To be able to better understand the outcome of the Oslo process, and its bearing on the active 
policies in the aftermath of Oslo, the negotiating phase needs to be placed in the wider context 
of the unequal power dimensions between the Palestinians and the Israelis.  
It is clear that the two parties came to the table with diverging interests. Yet, overshadowed the 
fact that the outcome of the process was a product of unequal power is not clarified enough in 
some debates on the Oslo process and the two-state solution. Israel, being the more powerful 
actor in the process, was able to impose their interests and political agenda on their adversary. 
The Israelis were able to use their larger military, diplomatic and economic power to secure 
their objectives, but also to heavily influence the narrative underpinning the peace-talks 
(Lieberfeld, 2008). This ability to influence the peace discourse was described by Menga 
(2016, p. 403) as follows: “The second dimension of power is less visible, covert (…): it is the 
ability to control the political agenda and to create barriers that would impede certain issues to 
be discussed.”  
I thus argue in this section that the inequality between the two parties manifested on two levels: 
more overtly so through Israel’s strategic and economic advantage, and less visible so through 
Israel’s ability to heavily influence the contentious issue of recognition and the formation of 
the narrative around the peace process. 
 
4.1. From recognition to results 
 
The Oslo peace process, starting in December 1992, involved two parties representing Israel 
and the Palestinian people through the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter PLO). 
Representing the latter was Ahmed Qurie (also known as Abu Ala) and representing Israel 
were Uri Savir, Yossi Beilin, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak. Their respective leaders were 
part of the process to an extent, but the aforementioned were directly involved with the 
negotiations. Though similar attempts to a peaceful resolution to the conflict were ongoing at 
the same time (in Madrid and Washington), the Oslo process presented Israel with a strategic 
opportunity to negotiate with a partner (the PLO) that was at the time considered a more viable 
partner for a potentially successful peace process. On top of that, the Oslo process would be 
pursued in secrecy which meant that both parties would face less issues with public support 
and public outcry as negotiations would be ongoing (Lieberfeld, 2008). 
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During the 26 years preceding the Oslo process, Israel had controlled the Occupied Territories’ 
water and land resources. It had dominated their economy, their geostrategic position and their 
people. As this had led to a clear power and knowledge asymmetry, negotiating with the PLO 
at the Oslo process enabled the Israeli delegation to leverage this asymmetric power and have 
‘the upper hand over the PLO’ (Haddad, 2016). As Shimon Peres (Israeli Foreign Minister 
during the peace process) held in his memoires on the Oslo process: “The reports from Oslo 
indicated that the PLO was in serious difficulties, both financial and political, and the time was 
therefore right for Israel to clinch a deal with the organization” (Peres, 1995, p. 284). Ahmed 
Qurie also reflects on the PLO’s pre-Oslo position as one weakened by decades of Israeli 
control, and the fracturing of Palestinian society. He recounts: “The Palestinian national 
movement faced deadlock … The doors of many capitals that were vital for PLO’s survival 
were closed” (Qurie, 2006, p. 293). Given the PLO’s position at that time, it thus was also a 
strategic move on their part to enter into negotiations with Israel as the “sole representative of 
the Palestinian people” (Honig-Parnass & Haddad, 2007, p. 44). Taking this role in the peace 
process would be vital to their survival. 
Coming to the table, the demands of both parties seemed irreconcilable. Some of those 
demands could be overcome, it was thought, through the exchange of mutual recognition. Yet 
highly contentious an issue, recognition had been a central feature of the conflict itself, and it 
would inevitably have to play a major role in the peace process. Though the recognition of 
Israel had always been a painful issue for the Palestinians, the PLO eventually conceded to the 
issue of recognition “as a strategy defensive of Palestinian interests” (Qurie, 2006, p. 295). The 
exchange of recognition was thought to have brought the PLO the means to improve their geo-
strategical, economic and financial position helped by the newly gained legitimacy of their 
leadership over the Palestinians. 
For Israel, recognition of their counterpart would enable the continuation of the peace-process. 
As Jamal (2000, p. 38) held: “Any transformation of the conflict requires the ruler to recognize 
the identity of the ruled and their right to manage their lives independently.” However, it also 
presented Israel with a strategically beneficial move. Israel possessed ‘hard-power’ geo-
strategically, militarily and economically speaking, yet lacked political legitimization for their 
settler colonial project. To remedy this, Israel would (selectively) give up part of the ‘old-
fashioned’ techniques of colonial control, and relinquish their direct control to a body that 
would be responsible for and representative of the Palestinian people while remaining reliant 
upon Israel; the PLO (Haddad, 2016). This process would be facilitated by Israel’s recognition 
of the PLO.  
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The large power asymmetry between Israel and the PLO had a vital influence on how the 
mutual recognition would be used further down in the negotiation process. Though ‘mutual,’ 
the overtly larger power of Israel did (less visibly so) change what this ‘mutual’ recognition 
entailed. According to Lieberfeld (2008, p. 143-44) “The asymmetric commitments in the 
letters of recognition signed by Israel and the PLO reflected the skewed power relations 
between the parties.” Similarly, Ahmed Qurie (2006) writes: 
The balance of power drastically favoured Israel and worked against the Palestinians. 
This was reflected in the behaviour of the Israeli negotiators on all issues and at every 
stage … We derived our power from the justice of our case, as opposed to the Israelis, 
who sought to define what was just on the basis of their power. (pp. 296-97)  
This statement indicates that besides the obvious power imbalance, both parties based their 
claims on a different foundation. This meant that Israel entered the negotiations over the control 
of the Occupied Territories as though it was something they could ‘give’ to the Palestinians as 
opposed to something Palestinians would have a right to. Following the Israeli Zionist 
narrative, “the settlers’ right to their settlements is a given, their sovereign tie with Israel 
unquestioned, thus cancelling out the possibility of genuine Palestinian sovereignty over the 
territory they will get within the framework of the peace process” (Jamal, 2000, p. 47). Yet, 
the Palestinians entered the negotiations over the control of the Occupied Territories with their 
claims based on their historical narrative that their right to land was a given since they had 
already been living there. Both parties thus came to the negotiations with claims that were 
based on two historical narratives that were incompatible. Their claims, or as Lieberfeld (2008) 
called them ‘win-sets,’ could thus not overlap or be converged as their foundations were 
irreconcilable. 
To overcome this, the peace negotiations would have to follow one or the other narrative. The 
process could consequently proceed because the Israeli negotiators were able to use their power 
advantage to have their historic narrative dominate the peace process. As Jamal (2000, p. 47) 
held: “the fundamental right is Israel’s” – allowing it to shape and inform the peace process 
narrative. This did not stand in the way of the process of mutual recognition; rather, it played 
in the hand of the more powerful Israel, and determined what exactly both parties’ recognition 
entailed. 
 
4.2. Fitting the Palestinian people into the Israeli narrative 
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The skewed power relations between the two parties were clearly reflected in what Lieberfeld 
(2008) called ‘the asymmetric commitments’ in the Letters of Mutual Recognition between 
Israel and the PLO, signed on 9 and 10 September 1993. In return for the recognition of the 
state of Israel and their national rights, the Palestinians were only offered the recognition of 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, with no official mention of any national 
rights. Not only did this mean that this form of recognition could only be extended to those 
Palestinians that were under the influence of the PLO leadership (those in the Occupied 
Territories), it also only extended to those Palestinians that recognized the Oslo process. No 
mention was made of the Palestinians that were in refuge in neighbouring countries for 
example. The letters thus were the start of a negotiating process between a state with national 
rights (Israel) and an organisation representing only a segment of all Palestinians (the PLO). 
Israel and the PLO were partners of unequal worth in the Oslo process (Arnon & Weinblatt, 
2001; Rabinowitz, 2000). As Fjeldstad and Zagha (2002, p. 1) concurred: “The Oslo 
Agreement was not an agreement between equal partners, but an agreement between an 
occupying power and an occupied people.” 
The recognition of the PLO would, according to the Israelis, be a step towards autonomy. 
Instead, it completely ‘dissected’ the Palestinian problem as a whole – for it did not recognize 
the unity of the Palestinian people. As they were separated into groups in the peace process, 
they were disconnected from the Palestinian historical narrative of having a right to the land. 
This right would directly stem from them being a unified people – which they were not 
according to the Letters of Mutual Recognition. This played in the hands of the Israeli narrative 
regarding their right to the land, which was essentially the opposite: the Zionist concept that 
all of the land belonged rightfully to Israel and its inhabitants. Consequently, the Palestinians 
living in the contested areas were submerged in the Zionist narrative. As Jamal (2000, p. 49) 
held: “There is no doubt that recognizing the equal status and historic rights of the Palestinians 
would be extremely painful for the Israeli side insofar as it would cast doubt on the justice of 
the entire Zionist enterprise.” The strategy to “divide and fracture” was not a new one; the 
overriding logic since the start of Israel’s colonization project has been to deny the Palestinians 
their unity (Hanieh, 2013). 
The discourse on Palestinians (and their lack of right to the land) has been so essential in the 
self-identification of Israel and Israelis, that the entire concept of Israel’s sovereignty is 
contingent upon the non-sovereignty of the Palestinians. It was thus paramount for the Israeli 
negotiators to have their narrative dominate that of the Palestinians.  
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Following this argument, Israel’s identity, and with it their rights, seems based upon the notion 
of the absence of Palestinian rights. Thus, when the PLO was subjugated to the Israeli peace 
narrative in the Oslo process, the Palestinian narrative was delegitimized and deconstructed. 
Without Palestine’s competing narrative, Israel’s narrative could reign supreme. 
This is one of the issues that led to the illusionary ‘path to peace’ thought to be the essence of 
the Oslo peace process. By surpassing the foundational roots of the Palestinian question 
(recognizing the Palestinians as a unified people and their ethno-territorial claim to the land 
(Rabinowitz, 2000)) and omitting the rights of Palestinian people, any solution that would 
follow from the Oslo peace process could not be mutually satisfactory and bring about equality 
and peace. 
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5. Formalizing economic relations: trade, taxation and labour 
 
In this part of the analysis, I will show how some of the articles and provisions of the Oslo 
agreements maintained the unequal power structures present before Oslo, and how they are 
linked to some of the economic policies resulting from the Oslo peace process. As mentioned 
in the previously, I argue that the Oslo Accords reflect the imbalance of power on many 
different levels between the Palestinians and the Israelis, as well as the unequal negotiating 
capabilities of the two parties. In this chapter I will link those inequalities, formalized in writing 
in the Oslo Accords, to the economic policies that followed from the Oslo peace process.  
 
5.1. Trade relations and trade policy 
 
From the start of the occupation in 1967 up to 1994, Palestinian trade regulations were 
determined by Israel and effectively followed Israel’s own trade policy. All import-standards, 
levies, import-tariffs and other trade mechanisms in effect for Israel were also in effect for the 
Palestinian territories. As previously mentioned, the Declaration of Principles already mentions 
the need for ‘cooperation in economic fields’ in Article XI. It refers to Annex III and IV, in 
which it sets out a variety of programmes with the purpose of regional and economic 
development. However, in 1994 any existing regulations concerning economic policy were 
largely replaced by the guiding principles of the Paris Protocol, that would come to govern the 
trade relations, and more broadly the economic relations, between Palestine and Israel.  
In the area of trade, the protocol provides regulations for Palestine’s import and export policy. 
It governs not only the trade between the two parties to the agreement, it also governs the trade 
relations between the Palestinians and the rest of the world (Elmusa & el-Jaafari, 1995).  
 
5.1.1. Import policy 
 
Article III concerns import policy and mentions three annexed lists (A1, A2, B) that contain 
the goods that the PA is allowed to import from a place other than Israel, provided they follow 
certain standards of quality, and they meet the requirements regarding origin and quantity. 
Goods on lists A1 and A2 are food products with the exception of fresh fruits and vegetables, 
agricultural products such as cotton, basic construction materials such as cement, mineral and 
chemical fertilizers and some household electric appliances such as washing machines. There 
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are a couple of restrictions listed in Article III of the Paris Protocol concerning the import of 
goods listed on lists A1 and A2. The PA will be able to set the customs levels for the import of 
theses goods, but they must be based on the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT, 
1994), as it would take effect in Israel shortly after the signing of this document. This thus 
deprived the PA of autonomy in setting their own tariff levels. Furthermore, all construction 
materials, household appliances and any type of mineral or chemical fertilizers would have to 
be imported from either Egypt or Jordan, allowing the import of the other goods mentioned on 
the Lists from Jordan, Egypt or any other Arab or Islamic country. Not only are there 
restrictions concerning the origin of the product, the products themselves cannot be final-
assembly products. For a large part, they have to have been “locally produced” in the countries 
mentioned above. Article III, paragraph 8, subparagraph a(iii), states the following: “The value 
of the costs of the materials produced in that country, plus the direct processing costs in it, do 
not fall short of 30 percent of the export value of the goods.” This provision significantly 
restrained the possibility for Palestinians to trade with partners other than Israel even further. 
Due to proximity and the given restrictions on origin, Jordan and Egypt are the most likely 
trade-partners for import of for example household appliances. At the same time however, 
those products have to meet the Israeli quality standard; a standard that resembles that of 
European or American products. Generally speaking, the electric/household appliances coming 
from Egypt or Jordan that meet the requirement of at least 30% domestic content, do not meet 
that quality standard. These contradicting regulations essentially meant that for many goods 
that were listed on List A1 and A2, Palestine still had to turn to the Israeli market to import 
them. 
Besides restrictions on origin, tariffs and type of product, Article III of the Paris Protocol also 
tied the Palestinian trade sector to quantitative restrictions. These limitations were to be 
determined by both parties according to “Palestinian market needs” (see Paris Protocol, Article 
III, paragraph 2(a)). A group of experts would make an estimate of those needs based on the 
“best available data regarding past consumption, production, investment and external trade [of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip]”, following Article III, paragraph 3. However, according to 
Elmusa and el-Jaafari (1995), “the quantities of construction materials, fertilizers, and wheat 
[…] were preset in the protocol at levels equivalent to an estimated 50 percent of the market 
needs.” Though paragraph 3 does include the establishment of a sub-committee that will review 
those estimates every six months, and promises to adjust for population growth, such estimates 
are still highly complex and problematic. Other than uncertain population size numbers, wages 
 27 
can change and there are no reliable measurements of how demand changes when income 
rises/falls (Elmusa & el-Jaafari, 1995). 
The goods on List B concern mostly capital goods that can contribute to economic 
development. It lists products such as construction equipment, household textile machinery 
and agricultural equipment and tools. As these goods were considered essential for the 
Economic Development Programme, mentioned in the DOP, Annex IV, paragraph 2(b), no 
restrictions in respect to origin, quantity or tariffs were applicable to them. The only restriction 
that does apply to goods on List B is that of preset standards (i.e. Israeli standards) they have 
to adhere to. For the capital goods on List B, motorized vehicles and petroleum (dealt with 
separately; respectively in Article III(11) and Article III(12) in the protocol) this meant that the 
PA did not have to follow Israeli tax rates on these goods anymore. Financially speaking this 
was positive, as these products were now freed of the previously (high) Israeli tariff on capital 
equipment of 21%. The former tariff was too high for the development requirements of 
Palestine (Elmusa & el-Jaafari, 1995). Despite this apparent gain, it must be noted that not all 
types of capital investment goods were on List B. Relatively important for the development of 
the Palestinian (or any) economy were computers – which were not listed. Their import was 
still subject to Israeli customs regulations, and thus a sizeable investment for a weak(er) 
economy. 
For any goods that are not on either lists, or that exceed the predetermined allowed quantities, 
the prevailing Israeli customs rate, purchase tax rate, levies and excise rate have to be used by 
the PA. To further ensure similarity between the two import systems, the PA has to levy a 
minimum VAT (value-added tax) rate of 15-16% on all imports (Israel’s VAT rate is 16-17%), 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 5(b) and 7. The logic behind this requirement is that it would 
give Palestinian products free access to the Israeli market, without having them ‘flood’ the 
market because of lower tax rates. However, with an average per capita income in the 
Palestinian Territories of around $1,6466, as opposed to that of Israel at $18,6807, a VAT rate 
of at least 15% is “unusually high” (Molkner, 1996).  
A separate article is dedicated to the import regulations of agricultural products (Paris Protocol, 
Article VIII). The first paragraph of the article stipulates that “there will be free movement of 
 
6 This is the average of the GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$) of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
between 1996 and 2000. No earlier data was available. Data retrieved from the World Bank (2020): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?name_desc=false 
7 This is the average of the GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$) of Israel between 1996 and 2000. Data 
retrieved from the World Bank (2020): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?name_desc=false  
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agricultural produce, free of customs and import taxes, between the two sides”, yet subject to 
a set of regulations and exceptions (Article VIII(1)). Besides a set of provisions covering the 
(veterinary) standards of the imported produce, paragraph 14 of this article covers a specific 
restriction. The article states the following: “Without prejudice to obligations arising out of 
existing international agreements, the two sides will refrain from importing agricultural 
products from third parties which may adversely affect the interests of each other’s farmers” 
(Paris Protocol, Article VIII(14)). This clause is effectively more an obstacle to developing 
trade relations for the Palestinians than it is for the Israelis. Before the signing of this protocol, 
Palestine had not been in the (economic) position to commit to or arrange any international 
trade agreements, due mostly to the occupation that started in 1967 which left their economy 
considerably ‘weak.’ Furthermore, since the import flow of agricultural products from Israel 
to Palestine is larger than the import flow from Palestine to Israel, the “interests of each other’s 
farmers” seem to concern the Israeli farmers more so than the Palestinian farmers (OEC, 2018a, 
2018b). 
 
5.1.2. Export policy 
 
Pursuant to Article VIII (agriculture), paragraph 1 and Article IX (industry), paragraph 1, there 
will be free movement between the two sides, without any customs and import taxes. There are 
some exceptions to this rule. Similar to the constraints mentioned in Article III (import), goods 
exported from the Occupied Territories to Israel have to meet standards that were already in 
use in Israel. They concern environmental, veterinary, health and safety standards. Other than 
those standards, the article stipulates that there should be relative free and unrestricted access 
to each other’s markets, for agricultural produce and industrial goods. There is one other 
significant restriction: Article VIII, paragraph 10 sets out a temporary restriction on the export 
of poultry, eggs, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes and melons. The article mentions that these 
specific quantitative restrictions are to be phased out by 1998. According to Elmusa and el-
Jaafari (1995), these temporary quantitative limitations on the export of these goods were put 
in place to protect the Israeli farmers from Palestinian competition. The protection of Israeli 
producers however effectively quashes the would-be export advantage of the Palestinian 
producers. Furthermore, protection of producers was not awarded vice versa. There are no 
(temporary) restrictions for Israel to export agricultural produce or industrial goods to the 
Occupied Territories, leaving the Palestinian producers unprotected as compared to the Israeli 
producers, and thus heavily disadvantaged. On top of the protection afforded to the Israeli 
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farmers, their sector is also highly subsidized in comparison to that of the Occupied Territories. 
According to Nashashibi and Kanaan (1994), financial support given by the Israeli government 
averaged around 32% of the value of the agricultural sector’s output between 1984 and 1990. 
This puts the Israeli farmers at an even more advantaged economic position and further vitiates 
the possibility of economic competition between the Israeli and Palestinian farmers. 
Concerning the export to countries other than Israel, there do not seem to be any clear 
restrictions. It is likely, however, to assume that similar rules apply to the export policy as do 
to the import policy. Within the bounds of the protocol, the Palestinians are allowed to export, 
as long as it does not endanger the interests of “Israeli producers” (Article VIII, paragraph 14).  
This essentially has resulted in Israel becoming the one viable market for Palestinian producers, 
with little opportunity to diversify trading partners. Up to present times, Israel has remained 
Palestine’s largest export destination. Around 80% of Palestine’s export was to Israel, whereas 
export to Palestine is only around 5% of Israel’s total export (OEC, 2018a, 2018b). These 
numbers indicate that the trade barriers following from the Protocol have institutionalized trade 
and market dependence on Israel for the Palestinians, but not a similar dependence on the 
Palestinian market for Israeli export. 
 
5.1.3. Trade dependency 
 
The power imbalance in the trade relationship between Israel and Palestine was thus 
institutionalized by the Oslo Accords, through the structures and regulations discussed above. 
Despite the fact that the architects of the Oslo Accords did envision an export-oriented and 
development-oriented Palestinian economy, the structures that dominated the outcome of the 
Paris Protocol and the Oslo period were those preserving the one-side trade relationship that 
was structured in light of the interests of Israeli trade. The outcome was, as it was before Oslo, 
still characterised by unimpeded access to the Palestinian market for Israeli goods without 
affording that same benefit vice-versa. The structure of the customs union, formalized in the 
Oslo Accords, thus allowed for unrestricted access of the highly subsidized, Israeli goods to 
the Palestinian economy. According to the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute 
(MAS), imports from Israel during the period from 1995 to 2000 amounted to 75 per cent of 
the aggregate of Palestinian imports (MAS, 2001, p. 127). It furthermore resulted in a 
problematic excess of imports over exports for the Palestinian economy, and highly limited 
access to the international markets.  As such, Israel remained Palestine’s most important 
market, accounting for roughly 90 per cent of all trade at the end of the interim period (Roy, 
 30 
1999, p. 72). Considering the fact that closures disrupt trade with Israel and there is no 
possibility to resort to markets elsewhere because of equally limited access means that the trade 
dependency on Israel incurs enormous costs on the Palestinian economy. In sum, the customs-
union structure in effect led to highly asymmetric trade and a crippling trade dependency on 
Israel. 
 
5.2. Taxation policy and revenue clearance  
 
Taxation is a matter that concerns both trade and labour policy; some of the particular tax 
arrangements that either resulted from or were reinforced by the Oslo Accords have been 
discussed earlier. From those earlier restrictions that already dealt with forms of taxation it 
became clear that the Palestinian Authority had no autonomy in shaping their own taxation 
policies. This section will however cover the specific system of tax revenue clearance, which 
warrants its own analysis. The quasi-customs union, institutionalized by the Oslo Accords, 
provided Israel with the sole control over the external borders. This subsequently gave the 
Israeli tax administration the authority to collect import taxes and VAT on behalf of the PNA. 
They furthermore collect income taxes from Palestinian labourers inside Israel. The collected 
taxes are transferred back to Palestine through this tax clearance system. Though destined for 
the Palestinian tax administration, the control over (the collection of) taxes meant that Israel 
was in the position to use that control as a form of pressure or even punishment. This section 
will discuss how the taxation clearance system works and its effect on the extent to which the 
PNA is dependent upon Israel for tax mobilization. It will therefore only cover those taxes that 
are collected by the opposing tax administration, and the regulation thereof as provided by the 
Protocol. 
When talking about taxation systems, it is customary to distinguish two types of taxation: direct 
taxation and indirect taxation. Direct taxation concerns taxes that are levied on a person that 
‘bears the ultimate burden of tax’ (e.g. income tax) whereas indirect taxation concerns taxes 
that are paid in the form of an increased prices for goods that are taxed (e.g. value-added tax, 
excises) (Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002). Both forms of taxation are mentioned in the Paris Protocol 
(Article V and Article VI, respectively) and in Oslo II (Annex V, Appendix 1 and 2, Article V 
and VI, respectively). There is another category of taxes that are linked to international trade, 
such as customs, excise tax and VAT on imported goods (Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002). For all 
such taxes that are not directly collected by the Palestinian Tax Administration, the tax 
clearance system with Israel is in place, as established in Article III, V and VI of the Protocol. 
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5.2.1. The taxation clearance system 
 
As previously mentioned, the economic relations between Israel and Palestine are conceptually 
the same as a customs union (albeit a ‘one-sided’ customs union). As is usually the case with 
customs unions, both direct and indirect taxes can be levied by either side’s tax administration, 
even if the taxpayer has no obligation to pay taxes to that specific tax administration (Kleiman, 
1999). Some examples include the payment of customs over goods that are imported to 
Palestine, but through Israel; VAT paid over goods that are bought in Israel or in the Israeli 
settlements by Palestinians; and income tax paid by Palestinian labourers that are employed in 
Israel or the Israeli settlements but are obliged to pay income tax in Palestine. To avoid double 
taxation and to ensure tax is paid to the rightful tax administration, Israel and the PLO agreed 
to a system of revenue clearance. The revenues that are covered by the clearance system are 
direct taxes (income tax), the VAT and purchase tax on goods that are produced in Israel but 
imported to Palestine, and the import taxes from international trade (Elkhafif, Misyef & 
Elagraa, 2014).  
 
i. Direct tax clearance: income tax 
 
The direct taxes, mostly covered by income tax paid by Palestinian labourers that work in Israel 
or in the Israeli settlements, are mentioned in the Paris Protocol, Article V, paragraph 4. It 
states the following: 
 
“Israel transfers the PA:  
a. 75% of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area employed in Israel. 
b. The full amount of income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area employed in the settlements.”8 
 
 
8 This specific article mentions the Gaza and Jericho area specifically as the agreement would first come into 
force in those areas, which would later also be extended to the other areas of the West Bank. The PA was to 
obtain authority over the remaining areas of the West Bank only after the signing of Oslo II, as the transfer of 
authority was to be a gradual process (see also the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area). 
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The income revenue of Palestinians working in Israel or the Israeli settlements had to be split 
between the jurisdiction in which they reside and where they consume social services, and the 
jurisdiction in which their income is generated. As most Palestinian labourers employed in 
Israel or the settlements commute to work on a daily basis, it is likely that they consume social 
security services in the Occupied Territories. Based on the principle that collected income tax 
is in part meant for the payment of social security services, the clearance of income tax was 
implemented (Alonso-Gamo, 1999; Kleiman, 1999). Israel would keep 25% of the revenue and 
transfer 75% to the PNA. Yet, no mention was made of retroactive payments of the tax revenue 
that accrued to Israel prior to 1993 (despite it amounting to roughly 3 per cent of Palestine’s 
GDP). 
 
Table 1: Income taxes – percentage of total fiscal revenues and percentage through the clearance system, 
1995-1999 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Income taxes (% of total fiscal revenues) 11.6 8.3 8.6 9.0 8.2 
Income taxes through the clearance system with Israel (% of total 
specific revenue base) 
10.1 7.2 9.1 13.5 8.4 
Source: Fjeldstad & Zagha (2002, p. 6, Table 2.1; p. 7, Table 2.2) 
 
Despite the fact that the revenue from income tax through the tax clearance system with Israel 
is not as large as the other tax categories (see Table 4), it is still considered a major tax base 
(Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002). It is furthermore a very volatile tax base, as it is highly vulnerable 
to tax evasion on the one hand (due to large-scale informal employment and generous income 
tax exemptions) and interruptions as a result of border closures (Zagha & Zomlot, 2004). 
 
ii. Indirect tax clearance: import tax 
 
Concerning import taxes and customs, the clearance system is more complicated. Article III, 
paragraph 15 states: “The clearance of revenues from all import taxes and levies, between Israel 
and the PA, will be based on the principle of the place of final destination.” For any and all 
goods upon which the PA would be able to claim import tax, the place of final destination must 
be the Palestinian Territories, despite the lack of ‘hard’ borders between Israel and Palestine. 
When successfully claimed, the collected customs must be transferred within six working days. 
The implementation of this specific clause, however, has led to a significant loss in revenue 
resulting from fiscal leakage to Israel. In the case that products were initially imported to Israel, 
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to subsequently be re-exported to Palestine, the Israeli interpretation of Article III, paragraph 
15 meant that these goods were not considered to have the final destination of Palestine, but 
rather Israel. Those goods could thus enter the Palestinian Territories duty free (Elkhafif et al., 
2014, p. 30). Only products that were not handled by Israeli middlemen, or subcontractors to 
Israeli import agents, would be eligible for customs duty clearance. Considering the amount of 
earlier discussed restrictions for Palestine to import goods, there are very few goods that are 
designated directly for the Palestinian territories (Kanafani, 2001; Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002). 
According to some estimates, around 60% of the goods imported by Palestine come through 
Israeli companies. In sum, since the principle of ‘final destination’ was interpreted in a way 
favourable to Israel, the import charges paid for goods that were ‘indirectly’ imported thus 
were collected by the Israeli tax administration, which consequently did not rebate those taxes 
to the PA. This led to a large amount of foregone tax revenue, estimated to be around six to 
seven per cent, expressed in percentage of Palestine’s GDP (Shaban & Jawhary, 1995, p. 
xxxiii).  
Another issue that complicates the functioning of the revenue clearance system is the fact that 
Palestinian importers often disguise the final destination of the imported products, as though 
they are intended for Israel. This results in more foregone revenue for the PA. This practice is 
incentivized by inspections and costly delays of by Israeli customs at the security checkpoints 
(Elkhafif et al., 2014; Molkner, 1996; Fjeldstad & al-Zagha, 2004). The Paris Protocol, Article 
III, paragraph 14(a) and 14(b) give Israeli customs officers the right to inspect goods (and tax 
collection). As per the protocol, Israel is not allowed to implement any regulations that would 
constitute to a non-tariff barrier, yet in reality, it is experienced as such. The result is thus that 
the Palestinian importers pay their dues, just not to the ‘right’ tax administration. Furthermore, 
large Israeli importers generally work with much lower unit costs and shipping rates. 
Palestinian businesses are thus even further incentivized to import through Israeli importers, 
which causes for more fiscal leakage to Israel (Molkner, 1996, p. 1448).  
As compared to the import taxes collected directly by the PNA from international trade, the 
revenues from the clearance system are considerably high. As there barely is any international 
trade, the import taxes that directly accrue to the PNA are of little relevance. From 1997 to 
1999, close to 90% of total collected revenues from international trade was collected by the 
Israeli tax administration (Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002, p. 39), as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Revenue from taxes on international trade (in million USD) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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1. Customs collected by the PNA 7.3 23 21.9 24.3 36.2 
2. Customs through the clearance system with Israel 18.9 87.1 142.7 205.3 263.3 
3. Total Customs 26.2 110.1 164.6 229.5 299.5 
Customs collected by Israel through the clearance system in % of 
total Customs (ratio of 2/3) 
72.1 79.1 86.7 89.5 87.9 
Source: Fjeldstad & Zagha (2002, p. 39, Table 7) 
 
From a more macro-level point of view, the underdeveloped economy prior to the Oslo period 
has obviously also contributed to the high level of fiscal leakage through non-direct import to 
Palestine. Due to the weak domestic production capacity, Palestinian importers often opt for 
cooperation with Israeli middlemen (Elkhafif et al., 2014). Because of its weak productive 
base, weak infrastructure and the confiscated land and water resources, it is often simply much 
easier for Palestinian importers to resort to indirect import through Israel (Roy, 1999). 
 
iii. Indirect tax clearance: VAT 
 
Article VI, paragraph 5 of the Paris Protocol sets out the rules and conditions for the clearance 
of VAT (and purchase taxes9). By the terms of the agreement, the Palestinian and Israeli tax 
administrations both collect VAT in their areas of responsibility, which subsequently has to be 
cleared with the other administration. The terms agreed upon provide that for goods and 
services purchased by Palestinians in the Israeli economy, the VAT ultimately accrues to the 
Palestinian tax administration. Vice-versa, the Israeli tax administration should receive all 
VAT linked to goods and services purchased by Israelis in the Palestinian economy. To 
expedite the clearance of those taxes that are to be rebated to the other tax administration, the 
two parties agreed to a unified invoice system. The payment of VAT on purchased goods is 
registered through these unified invoices. At a monthly meeting, the invoices are submitted to 
each side after which the party with a net balance of VAT claims against them has to transfer 
the claimed amount within six working days (Molkner, 1996, p. 1445).  
As the unified invoice is the only official document accompanying goods (and services) that 
are bought in the ‘other’ tax area, the process is highly vulnerable to tax evasion, informal trade 
and smuggling, and fiscal leakage therewith. One of the issues that leads to foregone revenue 
 
9 Purchase taxes are similar, but not identical to VAT. Purchase taxes are levied on products that either have 
negative effects on health or environment (an example would be fuel excise) or on products that have a high 
profit margin. Most of the revenue clearance is however covered by VAT, is this type of tax is always levied 
regardless of the type of product or service (Misyef, 2000). 
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for the PNA is the non-compliance of Israeli businesses with the invoice system. Not 
submitting the clearance invoices is a way for businesses to conceal their actual amount of sales 
and thus evade taxes. Similarly, the large informal market that exists does not comply with the 
invoice system, nor do they export and import through the official crossing points between 
Israel and Palestine where the VAT claims are collected and checked (Elkhafif et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the Palestinian VAT and Excise Taxes Department have expressed their concerns 
regarding the non-implementation and non-compliance of the VAT clearance agreements with 
regards to the (Israeli) border control. Because of a lack of adequate infrastructure, the 
Palestinians have not been in the position to monitor non-compliance and are neither in the 
position to enforce it upon the Israeli side (Molkner, 1996). The lack of structure and actually 
implementable rules concerning the clearance of VAT makes it a very uncertain and fragile 
category of revenue for the PNA. This is problematic as indirect taxes are an important category 
of taxes with regards to domestic revenue generation, according to Fjeldstad and Zagha (2002, 
p. 36). Specifically indirect taxes on goods and services make up a major tax base in the 
Palestinian economy (see Table 3, row 4). The fact that such an important tax base is vulnerable 
to potential non-compliance on the Israeli side (be it at the level of the consumer/merchant, or 
at the level of the tax administration) causes significant instability and uncertainty of the 
prospective annual revenue and its fiscal composition. In sum, these numbers reflect the heavy 
dependence of Palestine on Israel and their compliance with the VAT clearance system. 
 
Table 3: VAT and excise charges - percentage collected by Israel through the clearance system and 
percentage of total fiscal revenues, 1995-1999 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1. VAT and excise charges through clearance with Israel (in 
million USD) 
225.4 317.9 326 308.2 334 
2. Total VAT and excise charges (in million USD) 281.2 420.7 447.9 438.9 472 
3. VAT and excise charges collected by Israel through the 
clearance system (in % of total specific revenue base, ratio of 1/2) 
80.2 75.6 72.8 70.2 70.8 
4. VAT and excise charges (in % of total fiscal revenues, ratio of 
2/total fiscal revenues) 
66.0 61.2 54.6 51.0 47.7 
Source: Fjeldstad & Zagha (2002, p.6, Table 2.1; p. 7, Table 2.2; p. 37, Table 5) 
 
5.2.2. Tax dependency  
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The institutionalization of the revenue clearance system during Oslo solidified the dependency 
on Israel of the PNA. More than 60% of the PNA’s total revenue consisted of taxes that had to 
be cleared by Israel, already in 1995 (Al-Naqib, 1996, p. 26; Khadr, 1999, p. 113; Farsakh, 
2005a, p. 129).  
 
Table 4: Fiscal revenues collected by Israel through the clearance system, 1995-1999 (in % of total revenues 
from the specific revenue base) 
Revenue group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Income taxes 10.1 7.2 9.1 13.5 8.4 
Indirect taxes on domestic goods and services 80.2 75.6 72.8 70.2 70.8 
Indirect taxes on international transactions 72.1 79.1 86.7 89.5 87.9 
Non-tax revenues (fees and charges) 25.4 12.4 14.3 15.6 15.2 
Source: Fjeldstad & Zagha, 2002, Table 2.2 
 
Table 4 gives a more specific overview of the percentage of revenue that was cleared with 
Israel per major tax base from 1995 to 1999. These numbers indicate the extent to which the 
PNA is dependent on the Israeli tax administration when it comes to the accruement of tax. 
That dependency becomes detrimental when revenues are not rebated as a consequence of ‘bad 
behaviour’ or generally because of closures. In the summer of 1997 for example, tax revenues 
were delayed and consequently frozen for a period of time, in response to violent attacks 
(Zagha & Zomlot, 2004; Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). Due to such closures, the Palestinian 
Authority’s tax department estimated that  
it has lost 50 to 70% of its potential revenue from the value added tax paid by Palestinian 
for their import from Israel, the tariffs paid at the border for imports from abroad, and 
the income tax deducted from the wages of Palestinian working in Israel (Samara, 2000, 
p. 23). 
In sum, besides the fact that the clearance system takes away a (albeit symbolic) level of 
autonomy in creating Palestinian tax policy without external interference, it also ties the PNA 
to the Israeli ‘rules of the game.’ It is a reflection of the extent to which the PNA is dependent 
upon the Israeli tax administration and its level of compliance with the rules of the system (as 
prescribed in the Protocol). That compliance, however, is contingent upon the interpretation of 
those rules. The interpretation thereof is often clouded by political friction and security 
considerations. The functioning of the revenue clearance system is therefore subject to Israeli 
military and political decisions. These decisions, in turn, are based on (perceived) threats 
coherent with the Israeli security narrative.  
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5.3. Labour and Employment 
 
Labour forms one the major bases of economic structural links between Palestine and Israel, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2. From 1967 up to the 1990s, the Palestinian labour force had been 
highly dependent upon the Israeli economy. Before the start of the Oslo peace process, around 
30 per cent of the Palestinian labour force found employment in Israel or in the Israeli 
settlements (Roy, 1999, p. 69; Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001, p. 298). The low employment 
generation potential in combination with the much higher wages in the same industries in Israel 
as in the domestic economy, caused for a pattern of migration of the Palestinian labour force. 
Palestinian labourers moved away from the domestic traditional and productive sectors (such 
as agriculture) and moved to the low-wage, labour-intensive sectors in the Israeli economy 
(Taghdisi-Rad, 2014). They were largely employed in the agricultural and construction 
industries. Considered cheap, unskilled labour, the Palestinian workers reduced labour costs 
for Israeli employers (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001; Swirski & Dagan-Buzaglo, 2017). With the 
start of the peace process, the pattern of labour flows into Israel fundamentally changed. The 
overriding logic of security and the persistence of the closure system altered the nature of the 
labour relationship between Israel and Palestine. After 1994, the share of the Palestinian labour 
force employed in Israel or in the Israeli settlements declined to just 14 per cent in 1996 (Arnon 
& Weinblatt, 2001, p. 298). The dependency of the Palestinian labour force on Israel (i.e. its 
labour demand) thus became a function of their ability to access Israel and the Israeli 
settlements. In this section I will analyse why those changes occurred and focus on the manner 
in which Israeli policy and the Oslo Accords altered the regulation, and demand and supply 
forces, of Palestinian labour.  
 
5.3.1. Regulating the influx of the Palestinian labour force 
 
The issue of labour already played a central role in the negotiation stage of the Oslo process. 
Palestinian negotiators had initially expressed their preference for a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA), which would have required hard borders for customs purposes. At the time however, 
the unrestricted access to the Israeli economy for Palestinian labourers was considered more 
important. As the remittances from the labourers constituted a considerable part of Palestinian 
domestic revenue, and Israel was keen to formalize the (quasi) customs union that had been in 
place since 1967, the two parties settled on the labour question and free access to the Israeli 
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labour market remained instituted (Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). The Israeli negotiators 
however did want to reserve to itself the right to regulate the influx of those labourers, for 
security and political considerations (Farsakh, 2005a).  As such, Article VII of the Paris 
Protocol enshrined that wish. Paragraph 1 states the following: 
 
Both sides will attempt to maintain the normality [emphasis added] of movement of 
labour between them, subject to each side’s right to determine from time to time the 
extent and conditions of the labor movement into its area. If the normal movement is 
suspended temporarily by either side, it will give the other side immediate notification, 
and the other side may request that the matter be discussed in the Joint Economic 
Committee. 
 
Besides the fact that the Protocol does not prescribe how the ‘normality’ of movement should 
be maintained, it also fails to explicitly mention what is meant with ‘normality.’ The supposed 
normality of movement had already been disrupted due to both the permit system that was 
instituted after the first Gulf War, and the closures (which will be discussed in the following 
section). Article VII thus did not provide the guarantee of free movement of labour, but instead, 
guaranteed the freedom to restrict entry.  
Though the article seems even-handed and reciprocal, it affects the side that exports the larger 
share of labour most. The anticipation should have been made that the flow of Palestinian 
workers into Israel would continue to be the only direction of labour flows. It furthermore does 
not acknowledge that all workers will be of the type that cross the border in the morning and 
have to return home at the end of the day (in Europe referred to as ‘Frontier Workers), as the 
right to establish (normally associated with the freedom of movement) is not afforded to them 
(Wasserstein Fassberg, 1996).10 
For the settlement of disputes regarding restricted entry for labourers11, the article refers to the 
Joint Economic Committee (JEC). Yet, the Committee never actually functioned the way it 
was intended to (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001; Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). Khalidi and 
Taghdisi-Rad (2009, p. 16) called the JEC an ‘unwieldy, politicized body whose technical 
 
10 Article VII is not accompanied with provisions or regulations covering the right of Palestinian (or Israeli) 
workers to enter, establish or exit the territory in which they are employed. Regulations covering passage from 
one area into the other can be found in Annex I of the Cairo Agreement. It appears though that, under the 
agreement, the Palestinian Authority does not have the right to deny entry to Israelis.  
11 The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was established under the Paris Protocol, Article II. The Committee 
was to oversee the implementation of the agreement, and to hear and review any possible disputes concerning 
the regulations of the Paris Protocol. 
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machinery never served an effective dispute resolution function.’ This, in part, was due to the 
fact that the activities by the JEC were also dictated by Israel’s logic of security. Any case of 
suspension of the ‘normality’ of movement that hypothetically could be brought before the 
JEC, could be justified in terms of security considerations. 
 
5.3.2. Institutional barriers to labour mobility 
 
Before the formalization of restricted labour flows in Article VII, other developments had 
already heavily influenced the level of ‘normality’ and redefined the labour relationship 
between Israel and Palestine. The fact that labour mobility became conditioned upon Israel’s 
security started with the establishment of the permit system. The general permit system was 
introduced in 1991, after the first Gulf War, as a way to restrict and control general movement 
of individuals. The new system required Palestinians to obtain individual permits to cross into 
Israel, for any activities, thus including employment. A permit would hypothetically be granted 
upon the issuance of a security clearance by Israeli army officials. It furthermore required 
Palestinian workers to obtain proof of the request for their services from the Israeli employer 
as well as an official workers registration (Farsakh, 2005b, p. 105). With this policy in place, 
the Israeli military establishment could at any given time decide to deny permit requests. The 
number of Palestinian labourers employed in Israel consequently dropped from 1993 onwards 
(Al-Qadi, 2018; Farsakh, 2005a). The Oslo Accords initiated even stricter criteria for obtaining 
permits. Since 1993, permits were only given to married men, above the age of 28 and only for 
a period of two months at a time. Renewal of the permits was not automatic, and labourers 
were not guaranteed a new permit after the expiry date but instead had to re-apply (Farsakh, 
2002b).12 Table 5 shows data on unemployment and employment in Israel from 1995 onwards. 
Even though there was a moderate increase in employment after 1996, they never returned to 
the pre-Oslo levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Permits for entry into the Israeli settlements in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were much easier to 
obtain; the age restriction was only 18 years old, and the marital status was irrelevant (Farsakh, 2002b). 
 40 
Table 5: Labour Force Status (general unemployment and employment in the Israeli areas), 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Unemployed (as % of 
total Palestinian labour 
force) 
18.2 23.8 20.3 14.4 11.8 14.3 
Employed in Israel or the 
Israeli settlements (as % 
of total Palestinian labour 
force) 
16.2 14.1 17.1 21.7 22.9 18.8 
Source: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Labour Force Survey 2012. 
 
To further increase the level of control over Palestinian labour flows, the closure policy was 
introduced. In response to a series of terrorism-related attacks, roadblocks were put up without 
prior notice and any existing permits would be suspended for as long as the closure was upheld 
(Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). The closures were declared for various lengths of days and would 
deny workers entry from the Palestinian areas based on varying factors such as marital status, 
age, sex. The closures also varied in terms of geographical location and severity (MAS, 2001, 
p. 8). The periods of closures have continued, often following attacks, or the imminence 
thereof, from the Palestinian territories. Between 1994 and 1999, the total amount of days of 
closure reached 443 days, constituting an average of 2.5 months a year of restricted access to 
the Israeli (labour) market (Farsakh, 2005a, p. 130).  
 In sum, the regulation of the influx of Palestinian labour through the permit system and the 
closure system (and the officialization thereof in Article VII) not only resulted in higher 
numbers of unemployment, it also made that unemployment rate widely fluctuating from 
month to month. 
 
5.3.3. The ‘wrong assumption’ 
 
One of the issues of the Paris Protocol in relation to labour (especially Article VII), is that it 
conditioned its functionality on the assumption that borders would remain open. The phrasing 
‘from time to time’ seems to indicate that the architects of the Protocol may have envisioned a 
freedom of (labour) movement that would only by exception be disrupted. According to a 
number of authors, there was a hope that the Oslo process would attract enough foreign capital 
investment, domestic investment in industrial growth and induce domestic productive capacity 
to enhance local employment generation. There was an assumption that the flow of Palestinian 
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labour into Israel would be replaced by a flow of Palestinian labour-intensive goods. (Kleiman, 
1994; Diwan & Shaban, 1999; Farsakh, 2005a). If that development was successful, economic 
shocks from periods of closure (that would hypothetically only be ‘from time to time’) could 
be mitigated by built-in economic stabilizers and buffers. However, the export of Palestinian 
goods never managed to replace the export of Palestinian labour (Farsakh, 2005a), and a 
developed and tenable economy remained out of reach.  
The issue is that the Paris Protocol considered the question of labour to be one of economic 
considerations only, leaving potential political, territorial and security considerations out of it. 
As long as borders remained open, factor mobility would have been a function of economic 
considerations only. But the Paris Protocol was part of a larger framework of agreements 
(specifically Oslo II, as it was annexed to it) that pertained to mostly territorial and security 
regulations. As the Paris Protocol is not a self-regulative document, Article VII became 
peripheral to the security context of the larger body of the Oslo Accords, and ‘normality’ 
became a function of territorial and security claims. 
 
5.3.4. Israeli labour demand and Palestinian labour supply 
 
In the period after Oslo, labour relations between Palestine and Israel were not only structured 
around the territorial logic of Israel (the permit system and the closure policy) but were also 
still substantively informed by the economic forces of demand and supply. The structure of 
Israeli demand and Palestinian supply changed in terms of form and content however, as it was 
also affected by the volatility of access to Israel. Israeli demand for Palestinian labourers in 
mainly the construction and agricultural sectors initially remained a strong force and had 
political weight to the extent that periods of closures from time to time were lifted due to 
pressure from Israeli entrepreneurs (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). However, the permit and 
closure policies formed too much of an obstacle for Palestinian labour mobility and quickly 
became too large an issue for Israeli employers. Israel subsequently opened its labour market 
to migrant workers from mostly Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, replacing the cheap 
labourers from Palestine (Amir, 2002; Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001; Farsakh, 2002a; Kav LaOved, 
2018; Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 2009). In effect, Israel undid itself from their reliance upon 
cheap labour from Palestine, whereas Palestinian labourers to a large extent were still reliant 
upon employment opportunities in Israel and the settlements.  
The continued reliance on the Israeli labour market was due to a set of factors related to the 
employment generation capacity of Palestine. As mentioned before, the domestic Palestinian 
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economy prior to the Oslo process lacked in productive capacity and employment generation, 
resulting from the higher wages and the high demand outside the domestic economy. Israeli 
policies had furthermore reoriented Palestinian labour to unskilled- and low-skilled services, 
for the labour-intensive sectors in Israel. This reorientation meant that they moved away from 
domestic industry and agriculture, which Roy (1999) held to be sectors ‘critical to the 
development of productive capacity.’ When unemployment rose in Palestine as a consequence 
of both the institutional barriers as well as the changed demand structures during the Oslo 
period, the Palestinian public sector did manage to absorb a substantive part of the unemployed. 
25%-30% of the unemployed labour force in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank became 
employed in the public sector (MAS, 2000a, 2000b). Though it curbed the unemployment 
numbers to a certain extent, it also further stifled local productive development, and failed to 
contribute to the widening of the domestic tax base. As roughly 60 per cent of the state budget 
was reserved for public sector salaries, Farsakh (2002b, p. 5) even questioned the benefit of 
this development, in view of “the drain they represent on fiscal revenues […].” Additionally, 
the growth of the public sector was not sufficient to meaningfully curb the unemployment rate 
in light of the per annum growth rate of the Palestinian labour force of 4.1 per cent after 1993 
(IMF, 2001). The labour force was thus growing at a faster rate than there were employment 
opportunities in the Palestinian economy. With hardly any other outlet for their labour supply, 
the Palestinian labour force thus still had to turn to the Israeli labour market, even if that meant 
they had to resort to the informal labour market (causing even more foregone revenue in terms 
of income taxes). The regulation and commodification of Palestinian labour turned the 
Palestinian economy into a ‘labour reserve economy,’ and put Israel in the position to decide 
when and to what extent freedom of movement actually applied to the Palestinian labourers 
(Farsakh, 2002a). As Haddad (2016, p. 109) similarly held: “[…] the norm of freedom of 
Palestinian movement was reversed to one of blanket denial, with exceptions made for 
particular categories including workers […].” Despite the highly volatile demand and supply 
forces, and because of the incapacity to locally absorb the unemployed, Palestine’s labour force 
remained dependent on the Israeli labour market for employment.13  
 
13 The relationship between Israeli labour demand and Palestinian labour supply is even better understood in the 
context of the larger economic framework in which Israeli economy policy towards Palestinian labour changed. 
As Haddad (2016) held: “the hyperregulation and commodification of Palestinian labour was […] part of a 
larger neoliberal economic trend within Israel.” Another relevant example is the way Oslo prioritized foreign 
investment in the Palestinian economy over local capital (see DoP, Annex II, paragraph 3.f and Annex III, 
paragraph 4). The crowding out of local capital, however, often caused even more unemployment. For more on 
the liberalization of Israeli labour policy and the effect of the global economic trend on the economic dimension 
of the conflict, see: Haddad (2016), Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad (2014) and Samara (2000). 
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5.4.4. Labour and employment dependency 
 
The hyperregulation of labour, facilitated by Article VII, the permit system and the closure 
regime have incurred serious costs for the Palestinian economy and their ability to mobilize 
revenue and induce economic growth. Additional to the restraining affect they have had on the 
potential growth of the Palestinian economy they also incurred direct costs. Haddad (2016, p. 
110) compared the direct effect of the closure policy to a “switch,” “that when turned off, could 
eliminate one third of work force jobs, with the giving of an order.” On a similar note, Fischer, 
Alonso-Gamo and Von Allmen (2001) emphasized the directs costs that Israel’s closure policy 
could have: 
 
To illustrate the effect from the loss of labour income alone, roughly 120,000 
Palestinians worked in Israel and the settlements in 1999 and earned a daily net wage 
of around NIS 107 (about $25). Labour income from Israel would be about $750 million 
(assuming 20 working days per month), or about 18% of GDP. The first order effect 
from the loss of labour income due to a ten-day closure would thus be about $30 million, 
or about 0.7% of GDP (p. 265).  
 
The closure policy furthermore caused for losses in remittances from Palestinian workers 
outside the domestic economy, which signified a large decline in capital inflows for the 
Palestinian economy. Prior to the Oslo years, remittances constituted a large share of the 
disposable income, roughly amounting to about 30 per cent of Palestine’s GDP. During the 
Oslo years, that percentage dropped to less than 10 per cent of GDP (Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, 
2014; Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). Hassouneh (2018) found a positive relationship between the 
remittances from Palestinian workers in Israel and the economic growth of Palestine. Foregone 
remittances could have fuelled local consumption and surpluses could have been invested in 
local productive sectors. The Palestinian economy is thus sensitive to inflows of remittances 
from Israel, and as such, the Palestinian economy is substantially vulnerable to ‘revenue 
shocks’ resulting from disruptions in the level of remittances. 
Furthermore, the unstable unemployment rate and the subsequent growth of the public sector 
not only increased state expenditure it also caused a substantial loss of annual income, and 
significantly lowered direct tax revenues for the Palestinian National Authority treasury 
(Elkhafif et al., 2014, p. 17).  
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In sum, the restructuring of labour relations during the Oslo process was largely informed by 
policies of closure, security and control but failed to include economic even-handed policies 
or protection mechanisms for the unskilled, labour-abundant Palestinian economy.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyse the economic relations between Israel and Palestine 
within the corresponding framework of the Oslo peace process, and to research to what extent 
the Oslo Accords could have contributed to the continuation of Palestinian economic 
dependence on the Israeli economy. Although the Oslo peace process was heralded as a new 
vision for peace, with the novel additions of mutual recognition and the notion of future 
Palestinian self-determination and statehood, I conclude that it instead has contributed to the 
formalization and deepening of Palestinian economic dependence on Israel.  
The Palestinian trade-sector is still highly dependent on Israeli trade policies, and its potential 
to grow is still subjugated to policies that are largely shaped along the lines of Israel’s trade 
interests. The Oslo Accords (most notably the Paris Protocol) seems to solely have re-
articulated the trade relationship that existed between the two sides prior to 1993. It could even 
be concluded that trade policies have become more stringent. The regulations concerning 
taxation and the collection thereof, have created a high barrier to efficient revenue generation. 
Though some regulations concerning taxation seem to de jure improve the situation for the 
Palestinian economy, they do not decrease reliance on Israel’s remittance of tax revenue de 
facto. This is to a large extent due to the periods of closures and the political instrumentalization 
of the tax clearance system. Lastly, the Palestinian labour force is also still highly dependent 
on Israeli demand. The potential revenue that could flow from a functional labour relationship 
with Israel is impeded by the hyperregulation of labour movement, as regulated by the Paris 
Protocol. It furthermore has become subject to security considerations more so than economic 
considerations. Labour flow regulations, the closures and the permit system, and structures of 
demand and supply have turned the Palestinian labour force into a labour reserve for Israel. 
The economic dependence that resulted from years of selective integration and imposed 
separation during the direct occupation has not changed after the Oslo Accords. As Samara 
(2000, p. 23) put it: “In essence, the Paris Protocol did not effect [sic] any change in policy 
from the direct occupation era to the postdirect occupation era.” The Oslo Accords, and 
specifically the Paris Protocol, reflect the unequal power relation and consolidate and formalize 
the colonial economic structures that were present prior to 1993.  
On the one hand the Protocol created even-handed and reciprocal policies and regulations that 
failed to take into account that any power-sharing agreement would inevitably give Israel more 
power. These policies structurally and disproportionately disadvantaged the Palestinian 
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economy. On the other hand, policies were designed for the Protocol that solely serve to protect 
the interests of the Israeli economy, explicitly not affording the same rights and regulations to 
the Palestinian side. The mechanism design, of the Protocol specifically, was based on the 
illusionary separation of economic and political issues; it failed to prioritize economic 
considerations over security considerations. For example, the closure policy (as a manifestation 
of the security priority) was not considered a violation of the agreements’ terms (which it is 
prima facie), but instead was considered the prerogative of Israel. 
In sum, the Oslo Accords did not deal with the colonial and occupational aspects of the 
relationship between the Israeli and the Palestinian economy adequately. Quite the opposite; it 
enforced and sustained the colonial relation of domination and dependence by embedding 
economic questions into the Israeli security narrative, for Oslo institutionalized the supremacy 
of Israeli security over essentially all issues. 
The implications for the envisioned two-state narrative are thus serious. The formalization of 
dependence offered the Palestinian Authority little no expansion of (economic) policy space, 
and made the separation of the Palestinian economy from the Israeli economy even less likely. 
It severely limited the Palestinian goal of national liberation. The Oslo peace process 
essentially created the concept of an economically contained and dependent statehood, as 
opposed to the form of statehood that Israel itself enjoys. Regardless of whether or not this 
outcome was pre-envisaged, Oslo facilitated the continuation of Israeli colonial structures of 
land expropriation and the disarticulation of the Palestinian economy. As Khalidi and Taghdisi-
Rad (2009, p.1) put it “indeed, the very economic, territorial and institutional policies needed 
to continue occupation are those which perpetuate conditions not conducive to Palestinian 
sovereignty and statehood.” 
It therefore must be questioned whether there is any viability in a two-state solution, whether 
in the form proposed in the Oslo Accords, or in any other form. As I wrote this thesis, renewed 
interest in the two-state solution came to the fore (read, Trump’s ‘deal of the century,’ officially 
titled: “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli 
People”). This only emphasizes the need for more research into the viability of two states 
existing next to each other. Not only the economic dimension should be researched thoroughly, 
every single dynamic of the relationship between Palestine and Israel should be considered 
before policymakers propose plans that could potentially be detrimental to a viable liberation 
of Palestine. I have contributed to this body of research by arguing that as long as the 
Palestinian economy is not independent, decolonized and de-occupied, there cannot be spoken 
of a viable two-state solution.  
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